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Abstract 
This study documents the fact that large dividend increases are followed by a 
significant increase in leverage, consistent with management increasing the dividend 
to use up excess debt capacity. However, the leverage increase is not captured by a 
standard partial adjustment model of leverage. Nor does it reflect variables known to 
be related to dividend increases, such as firm maturity, investment, and risk. Instead, 
the dividend increase signals a complex change in the way firms adjust to their 
leverage target, but it does not signal a change in the target.  
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Since the work of Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) and Grullon, 
Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) (GMS), there has been a puzzle as to the signal 
being given by dividend increases. Although dividend decreases signal lower future 
profits, dividend increases do not signal an increase in future profits. Rather, GMS 
find evidence that dividend increases are followed by a move to a more mature phase 
of the firm: lower growth, declining reinvestment, and declining risk. This raises 
another important question: Why is this a signal? The age and growth stage of the 
firm are largely public information. Therefore, the dividend increase must signal 
private information regarding either exactly how mature the firm is or the intention of 
changed management behavior that the market does not anticipate.  
The signal from a dividend increase comes from the intention to increase 
payout, and the increase predicts a change in future investment strategy. The sources 
and uses of funds’ identity mean that payout and investment strategy are linked with 
financing. Therefore, we hypothesize that the signal should also contain information 
about future financing policy. In this study, we examine leverage changes subsequent 
to large dividend increases and show that a part of the signal given by a dividend 
increase is a change in leverage policy.  
Using a sample of 4,374 firms making large dividend increases, we show that 
(1) large dividend increases are followed by a significant increase in leverage; (2) 
although the leverage increase is consistent with these firms having excess debt 
capacity prior to the dividend increase, the increase in leverage after the dividend 
increase is not captured by a partial adjustment model of leverage or by a response of 
leverage to firm maturity, investment, and risk; (3) the change in leverage policy is a 
change in the conditional response to a future financing surplus; and (4) this change 
does not happen for dividend decreases. Thus, the change in leverage behavior we 
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find is not subsumed by the effects found by GMS. Further, the effect is asymmetric 
between dividend increases and decreases just as they find. We hypothesize that this 
asymmetry is primarily because large dividend increases are voluntary, whereas large 
dividend decreases are not. We therefore interpret the dividend increase as a signal of 
the change in leverage policy. 
To ensure that the dividend increase we study is voluntary, we use firms 
making large dividend increases.  We investigate three possible causes of the leverage 
increase following a dividend increase. The first is that the dividend signals a change 
in the leverage target itself, which we do not find. We then include various controls 
that have been shown to be related to dividend changes and/or leverage policy and 
find that these controls do not explain the change. Finally, we measure the change in 
the conditional response to deficits and surpluses and find that a dividend increase (or 
initiation) signals a change in leverage policy whereby the response of leverage 
changes to financial deficits and surpluses become considerably more convex.  
In the first step of the analysis, to investigate whether a change in the target 
leverage explains the leverage increase, we examine the deviation from target 
leverage before and after the dividend change using a procedure similar to that of 
Harford et al. (2009). We find that dividend-increasing firms are underleveraged at 
the time of the dividend increase. Firms initiating dividends and decreasing dividends 
by large amounts are also underleveraged. On average, the subsequent increase in 
book value leverage equals the leverage deficit at the time of the dividend increase for 
all three of these groups. Thus, these firms appear to behave on average as though 
they have leverage targets. We then examine the change in the leverage target after 
the dividend increase and find no change on average. Thus, the increased leverage is 
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related to a leverage deficit at the time of the dividend change, but not to an increase 
in target leverage.  
To control for standard explanations of leverage changes we then measure 
leverage changes as deviations from a standard empirical model of leverage targets 
with partial adjustment (Kayhan and Titman 2007, KT). We find that this model does 
not explain the leverage change.  
To control for the possibility that the leverage change is simply a by-product 
of other changes that have been shown to be related to dividend changes, we control 
for the variables that GMS and others have found to be related to dividend increases. 
We do this by augmenting the KT procedure with variables measuring risk, firm 
maturity, cash flow (CF), losses, tax, market timing, and debt rating (Brook et al., 
1998, Faulkender and Wang 2006, Skinner and Soltjes, 2011, Koch and Sun, 2004, 
DeAngelo et al., 1992, Baker and Wurgler, 2002, Graham, 2000, Hennessy and 
Whited, 2005, Charitou et al., 2011). We also allow the rate of adjustment to change 
subsequent to the dividend change and for a change in the response to CF, to capture 
the change in investment behavior found by GMS. We find that this augmented 
procedure does not explain the leverage increase following large dividend increases or 
dividend initiations. It does, however, explain the leverage increase following large 
dividend decreases.  
Given that none of these controls explains the leverage change for the 
dividend increase and initiation groups, we then investigate whether a large dividend 
increase signals a discretionary change in the way the firm manages its leverage. 
Specifically, we test whether the dividend increase signals a change in leverage policy 
conditional on future financing deficits and surpluses. Our main contribution is that 
we add to the description of the signal from dividend increases.  
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We find that dividend-increase and initiation firms differ from other firms in 
the way their leverage responds to financial surpluses and deficits. Their leverage 
change is a considerably more convex function of the financing deficit, raising the 
average level of the change and accounting for the leverage increase on average. In 
particular, when they have surpluses they do not use them to pay down debt in 
contrast to the average firm. Thus, the shift in leverage policy is a change in pecking 
order behavior conditional on whether there is a surplus or deficit. The dividend 
increase signals a change in leverage policy that is not predictable on the basis of 
either standard leverage models or the variables found by GMS to be related to 
dividend increases. This is consistent with the evidence in the study of Harford et al. 
(2009), which shows that firms move towards leverage targets after mergers, albeit in 
a somewhat complex way, and the evidence of Denis and McKeon (2012), that the 
evolution of a firm’s leverage ratio depends primarily on whether or not the firm 
produces a financial surplus. For a sample of firms that initiate dividends we find 
similar but larger effects, confirming the results of other studies that dividend 
initiations are a stronger signal than increases (Officer, 2011, Lee and Mauck, 2016). 
Finally, we investigate whether the change in leverage behavior is related to 
agency problems. We find some tentative indications that this is the case, although the 
sample for which we can measure agency effects is limited. 
Our results are related to the literature on whether the relationship between 
dividends and leverage is negative (Fama and French, 2002, Frank and Goyal, 2009) 
or positive (Ravid and Sarig, 1991). Consistent with the total distribution idea of 
Ravid and Sarig, we find a conditionally positive relationship between dividend 
changes and leverage changes for the sample of firms with a large dividend increase. 
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Thus our results are consistent with dividends and leverage being complements in this 
situation, rather than substitutes. 
Our work is also related to the extensive literature on leverage policy. The 
study falls into the category of leverage tests that focus on firms making active 
financial choices (Marsh, 1982, Hovakimian and Li, 2010). By focusing on large 
dividend increases it is likely that the leverage changes we observe occur at times of 
discretionary financial choices, avoiding the difficult issue of how to deal with firms 
whose leverage policy is passive (Frank and Goyal, 2015, Hennessy and Whited, 
2005, Hovakimian and Li, 2010, Leary and Roberts, 2005, Strebulaev, 2007, 
Strebulaev and Whited, 2012). Our results are consistent with the fact that partial 
adjustment models explain only a small amount of actual leverage behavior (Frank 
and Goyal, 2009, Lemmon et al., 2008, DeAngelo and Roll, 2015). They are also 
consistent with the idea of a broad range of acceptable leverage ratios around the 
target (DeAngelo and Roll, 2015)  
The article proceeds as follows. Section I develops the hypotheses. Section II 
describes the empirical methodology and variable construction, and section III the 
data. Section IV gives the empirical results. Section V discusses robustness tests, and 
section VI gives the conclusions and implications. 
 
I. Hypothesis development 
Firms that make large dividend increases do so voluntarily. Models of 
dividend signaling suggest that this should be a signal of quality, implying increased 
future profits (Bhattacharya 1979; Miller and Rock 1985). However, the work of 
GMS fails to find the hypothesized increase in profits. Instead, they find a change in 
firm maturity and related variables. But a large part of firm maturity is predictable and 
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so need not be signaled. The behavior they find which cannot be predicted before the 
dividend change includes declining reinvestment, so the dividend increase could be a 
signal of an unanticipated change in investment policy. Since investment policy and 
financing policy are closely linked through the pecking order view of financing, we 
hypothesize that the unanticipated change being signaled by a large dividend increase 
could include a change in financing policy.  
Specifically, we hypothesize that large dividend increases or dividend 
initiations signal a change in leverage policy of a type that could not be forecasted 
based on standard models of leverage. To be consistent with the move towards a more 
mature type of firm that is related to dividend increases, we hypothesize that the 
change is an increase in leverage. We require that the change is not related to 
predictable firm maturity variables, so that the dividend increase is a genuine signal: 
Hypothesis 1A: Firms making large dividend increases subsequently increase 
leverage in a way not predicted by standard models and not related to predictable 
firm maturity variables.  
The null hypothesis against which we test is that any change in leverage policy 
subsequent to a large dividend increase either is explained by standard models of 
leverage (trade-off, partial adjustment, or standard pecking order) or reflects the 
predictable maturing of the firm.  
In contrast to large dividend increases, large dividend decreases have a large 
non-discretionary component and do signal a fall in profit. Therefore, we do not 
expect them to have signaling content about leverage policy. Specifically, we expect 
any change in leverage subsequent to a large dividend decrease to be consistent with 
standard theories: 
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Hypothesis 1B: Firms making large dividend cuts will have a subsequent change in 
leverage that is explained by standard theories. 
As a robustness check, we also examine a sample of dividend-initiating firms. 
For these we expect to find a similar but larger effect, in line with the results of other 
studies that dividend initiations are a stronger signal than increases (Officer, 2011, 
Lee and Mauck, 2016): 
Hypothesis 1C: Firms initiating dividends subsequently increase leverage in a way 
not predicted by standard models and not related to predictable firm maturity 
variables. The effect is larger than for dividend-increasing firms.  
In summary, our hypotheses are that large dividend increases and initiations 
signal an unpredictable change in leverage policy and that large dividend decreases do 
not. 
 
II. Methodology and variable construction 
To ensure that the firms making dividend increases in our sample are signaling 
rather than just following a Lintner-like adjustment rule, we use firms making large 
dividend increases. Following GMS, we define large increases as greater than 12.5% 
(“dividend-increasing firms”). We also include firms with dividend decreases greater 
than 12.5% (“dividend-decreasing firms”). The threshold of 12.5% is motivated by 
GMS as being ‘the best in terms of including only big dividend changes’ (GMS, page 
391). It ensures a reasonable sample, while excluding changes that could contain no 
information surprise.1 
We examine changes in both book value and market value leverage over the 
five years following the dividend change. Following KT, book leverage is defined as 
                                                          
1
 In the robustness section below we also discuss the results for a threshold of 1%. 
9 
 
the ratio of book debt to total assets, where book debt is defined as total assets minus 
book equity, and book equity is equal to total assets less total liabilities and preferred 
stock plus deferred taxes and convertible debt. Similar to KT, we drop firm-year 
observations where this ratio is greater than one. Market leverage is the ratio of the 
book value of debt to the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of 
equity. 
In our tests, we first report the raw leverage change over the five years 
following a dividend change. Second, we use the KT procedure to predict the five-
year leverage change-based standard partial-adjustment theories and measure the 
effect net of this control. Third, we augment the KT control with variables that are 
known to be predicted by dividend changes, which could also be related to leverage 
changes. Finally, we test for a more subtle change in leverage policy. 
 
II.1 Target leverage and partial adjustment 
The KT procedure is a two-stage process. The first stage creates a proxy for 
target leverage using a regression of leverage on firm variables. We estimate this at 
year 0, the date of the dividend change. The second stage estimates the relationship 
between the five-year leverage change (over the period from year 0 to year 5) and 
variables measuring financial deficits (FDs), market conditions, and profitability over 
that same five-year period, after controlling for the leverage deficit at the beginning of 
the period and the change in target leverage over the five-year period.  
The proxy for the target debt ratio estimated in stage 1 is the fitted value from 
a Tobit regression of observed debt ratios on variables that proxy for benefits of 
leverage, such as tax deductibility of interest and agency costs of free CF, and others 
that proxy for costs of leverage, such as potential financial distress and bankruptcy 
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costs. The variables are profitability (EBITD), asset tangibility (PPE), research and 
development expense (R&D), selling expense (SE), firm size (SIZE), and the market-
to-book ratio (M/B). We include industry dummies to capture the industry-specific 
determinants of leverage not captured by the above variables.2 We also include a 
dummy for dividend-paying firms called DIV_PAY to control for the known 
relationship between dividend payment and leverage. DIV_PAY is equal to 1 for 
dividend paying firm-years, and 0 otherwise. 
Stage 2 of KT is a regression of the change in leverage over five years on 
variables that should be related to the change in the target leverage or the rate of 
moving towards the target (Baker and Wurgler 2002; Frank and Goyal 2003; Kayhan 
and Titman 2007; Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999). These variables are the LevDef at 
the beginning of the period measured as actual minus target leverage; the five-year 
change in the target leverage ratio (ΔTarget), measured as the difference between the 
year 5 target debt ratio and the target debt ratio measured in year 0; the five-year FD; 
two timing measures, yearly timing (YT) and long-term timing (LT), which capture 
variations in the M/B; the five-year cumulative stock return (r); and the five-year 
cumulative profitability (EBITD5y). 
The FD is the net amount of debt and equity the firm issues or repurchases in a 
given year. Specifically, the FD is defined as the sum of investments (I), dividends 
(D), changes in working capital (ΔWC), and net of net CF: 
 
Financial Deficit (FD) = ΔWC + I +D – CF 
 
                                                          
2
 See Kayhan and Titman (2007) for a detailed description of the measurement of these variables. 
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From an accounting identity, this sum is identical to net debt issues plus net 
equity issues. When this variable is positive, the firm invests more than it internally 
generates. When it is negative, the firm generates more cash than it invests; in other 
words, the firm has positive CF measured net of dividends, capex, and working 
capital. To capture the different behavior, we include the variable FDd, which is the 
FD interacted with a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the FD is 
positive. The profitability measure (EBITD) is defined as the sum of earnings before 
interest, taxes, and depreciation over five years scaled by the beginning firm value. 
This variable captures the availability of internal funds. 
The two timing measures, YT and LT, are based on the relationship between 
M/Bs and leverage (Baker and Wurgler 2002). The modified measures used by KT 
are: 
 
Yearly Timing (YT) =
4
h
h 0
FD * *
h
MM
t FD
B B
=
  
−  
  
∑  
 
Long-term Timing (LT) =
4 4
h 0 h 0
* h
h
M
t FD t
B
= =
    
    
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The sums are taken over years 0 to 4, so they measure the average market-to-
book, FD, and the interaction of these two variables over the five-year period. The YT 
measure is the covariance between external financing and the M/B, which measures 
the propensity to decrease leverage when the stock price is high. The LT measure 
captures the idea that the average propensity to finance with debt is related to the level 
of the share price. KT show that a combination of these measures is essentially 
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equivalent to the measure used by Baker and Wurgler. We also use the five-year 
cumulative log return on the stock (r) to control for direct effects of stock price 
changes on the debt ratio (Welch 2004).  
The Appendix shows the results of our estimation of stage 1 and stage 2 of 
KT. These results are in line with other studies. We use the ΔTarget to measure the 
behavior of leverage relative to target around the time of the dividend change, and 
stage 2 of KT to control for the effect on leverage of partial adjustment and of other 
variables subsequent to the dividend change. 
 
II.2 Leverage change subsequent to the dividend change 
To measure the fixed effects of leverage changes for dividend-change firms, 
we augment stage 2 of KT by including two dummy variables. The first variable, 
DIV_INCR, takes the value 1 if the firm has a dividend increase at time zero, and 0 
otherwise. The variable DIV_DECR takes the value 1 if the firm is dividend-
decreasing at time zero, and 0 otherwise. The dividend dummies are measured at the 
time of the dividend change and are included in stage 2 of the KT procedure, 
measuring leverage changes in the period (0, 5).3 
Dividend increases are known to signal variables that could also be related to 
changes in leverage. We next augment the KT procedure with variables that are 
known to follow dividend changes and could also be related to leverage changes. 
These are the levels of operating CFs (Brook et al. 1998; Faulkender and Wang 2006), 
variability of return on equity (SD ROE) (Skinner and Soltjes 2011), firm maturity 
(Age) (GMS), capex (GMS), and credit rating (Charitou et al. 2011). The CF measure 
(CF[0, 5]) is defined as the sum of CFs from operations before capex over five years 
                                                          
3
 An alternative specification is given in Bae et al. (2011), which is a partial adjustment model towards 
a target leverage ratio. However, the KT specification includes in stage 2 the ex post values of variables 
for which a large dividend change could be a proxy. 
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after the dividend change scaled by the beginning firm value. The variability of return 
on equity SD ROE is measured over the five years after the dividend change. We also 
include the changes in CF and SD ROE. Age is the number of years of data available 
on Computstat up to year zero. Capex is the total capex in the period (0, 5). We proxy 
the debt rating by a probability of default based on the Merton risky debt model 
(Charitou et al. 2011).  
To control for the effect of dividend status, we also interact DIV_PAY and the 
LevDef in stage 2. Finally, we interact the dividend change dummies with LevDef and 
CF to allow for different trade-off behavior of the firms’ changing dividends. These 
interactions should pick up any simple shift in financing policy, such as a change in 
the speed of partial adjustment. 
 
II.3 Policy shifts not picked up by the partial-adjustment model 
To capture more subtle shifts in leverage policy, we finally introduce 
interaction terms between the dividend change dummies and four variables: LT, 
SDROE, FD, and FDd. The idea is to capture the extent to which firms with large 
dividend increases show a change in their response to these pecking order variables 
after the dividend increase. This will pick up changes in the way the pecking order is 
implemented. For example, it will detect if financial surpluses are being used less to 
pay down debt.  
 
III. Data 
Our data selection procedure broadly follows that of KT. Our sample consists 
of firms listed in the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) files in the 
period 1979–2010, which also have records in the Compustat Industrial Annual Files. 
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We exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000–6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900–
4999). We also exclude firms with book values of assets below $10 million and M/Bs 
above 10 or below -100. We require that firms have at least five years of data so that 
we can track leverage over that period subsequent to a dividend change.  
Following the procedure of GMS, our dividend-change firms meet the 
following requirements: 
a) The dividend payout refers to quarterly cash dividends in US 
dollars. 
b) The stocks on which the dividends are paid are ordinary 
common shares. Thus, we exclude shares of American Trust components, 
closed-end funds, or real estate investment trusts. 
c) The previous cash dividend payment was paid within a window 
of 20–90 trading days prior to the current dividend announcement. 
d) The percentage change in dividends is between 12.5% and 
500% for the dividend increase sample. This criterion ensures that we include 
economically significant dividend changes at the lower bound and exclude 
outliers at the upper bound. For the decrease sample, the range is -12.5% to -
100%. 
e) The dividend announcement is not an omission or an initiation. 
This sample selection process yields 4,374 cash dividend increases and 2,522 
decreases.  
Similar to Grullon et al (2002) and Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995) we 
define a dividend initiation as the first quarterly cash dividend payment on ordinary 
common shares reported in CRSP. Reinstitution of a cash dividend is not considered 
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as a dividend initiation. The resulting sample contains 394 cash dividend initiation 
events. 
Firms that do not fall into the dividend increase and decrease groups are 
classified as firms that do not change dividends. The event year for a dividend change, 
T=0, is set as the corresponding fiscal year end of the quarter of the dividend change. 
We drop event observations with mixed (initiation, increase, and decrease) dividend 
changes within a five-year period. When a firm has succeeding dividend changes in 
the same direction within a five-year period, we keep only the first dividend change in 
the series.4 The percentage change in quarterly cash dividends for firm i is defined as 
the percentage difference between the quarterly cash dividend payout reported in 
CRSP on the event quarter ( 0,DIVi ) minus the corresponding dividend payment of the 
previous quarter ( 1,DIV −i ): 
1,
1,0,
0, DIV
DIVDIV
  DIV
−
−
−
=∆
i
ii
i  
 
This gives a pool of 7,290 dividend changes and initiations from a sample of 
2,072 firms. Additional to these dividend change and initiation firms our sample 
contains other 3,526 firms that pay dividends but they do not exhibit significant 
dividend changes during the examined period. This makes a total of 5,598 dividend 
paying firms. In addition to the dividend paying firms, our sample contains other 
11,310 not dividend paying firms. Therefore, the resulting sample consists of 16,908 
dividend paying and non-dividend paying firms. These figures are consistent with the 
general fact that the average fraction of firms that pay dividends is close to 30% in the 
last 3 decades. Skinner and Soltes (2011) provide evidence of a substantial reduction 
                                                          
4
 Our robustness tests show qualitatively similar results when keeping the last dividend change in the 
series instead. 
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of U.S. firms that pay regular dividends, from 60% in 1975 to 20% in 2002 and 29% 
in 2005. 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for our sample firms, separately for the 
initiation, dividend-increase, dividend-decrease, and no-change samples. Panel 1A 
compares the initiation, dividend-increase and dividend-decrease samples. The 
dividend-increase firms have lower leverage, but also differ in other characteristics, 
including market-to-book, tangible assets, and profitability. In later tables, we show 
the target leverage, estimated by KT stage 1, which reflects these differences. 
Panel 1B shows the comparison between the dividend-change firms and those 
that pay dividends that change by less than the threshold amount (firms that “do not 
change dividends”). Firms that increase dividends have lower leverage than those that 
do not change dividends. Firms that decrease dividends have higher book value 
leverage than the no-change firms but lower market value leverage as a result of their 
higher M/B. The two groups also differ from the no-change group in other 
characteristics. Dividend increase and initiation firms have higher market-to-book, 
PPE, profit, and R&D than no-change firms. The dividend increase firms are bigger 
than the no-change firms and the initiation firms smaller. The dividend-decrease firms 
are larger and have higher M/Bs than the no-change firms. 
In other comparisons between dividend-paying firms and non-payers (not 
shown), dividend-paying firms are significantly different from non-payers, having 
higher PPE and profitability, but lower market-to-book, SE, and R&D. The dividend-
paying firms also have higher average book and market leverage.  
 
IV. Empirical results 
IV.1 Raw leverage changes 
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Table 2 shows the evolution of leverage and other firm characteristics over the 
period following a dividend change. We examine both book value and market value 
leverage because they can show different effects (Welch 2004). The five-year changes 
in book value leverage for the dividend increase, decrease, and initiation samples are 
+5.0%, +2.0%, and +5.6% respectively. For market value leverage, they are +5.7%, 
+2.7%, and +9.4% respectively. These are all highly statistically significant. Thus, all 
three categories increase leverage significantly following the dividend change. 
There are also significant changes in other characteristics of the firms over the 
five-year period. In particular, all three groups show significant declines in 
profitability, as measured by EBITD scaled by net assets, and the dividend increase 
group shows a significant increase in its market-to-book ratio. 
 
IV.2 Leverage targets and deficits 
Table 3 shows the leverage target (estimated by stage 1 of KT) and LevDefs 
for the dividend change samples and the sample of firms that pay regular dividends 
but do not make significant dividend changes.5 Panel 3A shows that firms that 
increase and initiate dividends have a greater LevDef than dividend-decreasing firms. 
The book value LevDef at time zero for dividend-increasing firms is 5.2%, on 
average. This is very similar to the increase in leverage of +5.0% over the five-year 
period following the dividend increase. Thus, the average behavior of this group is 
consistent with there being a conventional book value leverage target. The dividend-
decreasing group has a book value LevDef of 2.8%, on average, at time zero. The 
subsequent increase of +2.0% in the five-year period following the dividend increase 
is similar to the LevDef at time zero. For initiations the figures are 7.2% for the deficit 
                                                          
5The sample for the KT procedure is slightly more restricted than that shown in Table 1.  
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and 5.6% for the subsequent change. Thus, the average behavior for all groups is 
consistent with book value leverage increases over the five-year period following the 
dividend change equal to the LevDefs at the time of the change, on average. 
For market value leverage, there are much larger LevDefs at time zero, 11.1% 
for the dividend-increase firms, 8.1% for the leverage-decrease firms, and 11.5% for 
the initiation firms. The subsequent market value leverage increase in the five-year 
period following the dividend increase is 5.7% for the dividend increase firms, 2.7% 
for the dividend decrease firms, and 9.4% for the dividend initiation firms. Thus, the 
increase in market value leverage is, on average, less than the LevDef at the time of 
the dividend change. 
 
IV.3 The change in leverage targets after the dividend change 
Before testing whether the leverage increases can be explained by partial 
adjustment behavior, we examine the evolution of the leverage target after the 
dividend change to test whether the dividend change predicts changes in the variables 
that measure the leverage target. Table 4 shows the evolution of the leverage targets 
over the five years before and after the dividend changes. The firms making dividend 
increases have target leverage that increases slightly in the five years prior to the 
dividend change. Subsequent to the dividend change, the target is stable. The 
explanation for the leverage increase after the dividend increase does not lie in a 
change in the target. Very similar behavior is observed for the dividend decrease 
sample. For the initiations sample the leverage target decreases slightly after the 
dividend change, so it cannot explain the increase in leverage. 
Table 5 summarizes the average results. The change in book value leverage 
over five years after the dividend change is approximately equal to the LevDef at time 
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zero for all three groups. In no case is any significant part of the leverage increase 
explained by a change in the leverage target. For market value leverage, the increase 
in leverage is less than the time zero deficit; but again, the change in leverage is not 
explained at all by a change in the target. 
 
IV.4 Controlling for standard leverage variables and policies  
The average behavior looks so far as if it may be consistent with these firms 
adjusting towards a standard leverage target, as implemented by stage 1 of the KT 
procedure. We now check whether implementing stage 2 of the KT procedure to 
allow for partial adjustment towards that target explains the leverage increases. Table 
6 shows a series of regressions similar to stage 2 of KT, but increasingly augmented 
with extra terms that may be related to the dividend change. Panel 6A is for book 
value leverage and Panel 6B for market value leverage. 
The first column in Table 6 is the average change, as discussed above. The 
second column, “KT model control,” augments the KT stage 2 variables with dummy 
variables taking the value 1 for dividend increases, decreases, and initiations and 0 for 
other firms. All three dummies are highly significantly positive in both the book 
leverage and market leverage regressions, indicating that this standard implementation 
of the partial adjustment model does not explain the leverage increases following 
large dividend changes.  
 
IV.5 Controlling for variables associated with a dividend change 
The KT procedure does not include all variables that might be related to 
dividend changes. Table 6 shows in the third column, “Augmented KT”, the result of 
augmenting the KT stage 2 regressions with the levels and changes of variables 
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known to be related to dividend changes. The level and change of CF are significantly 
negatively related to changes in both leverage measures, but the earnings stability 
variables are either insignificant or go in the wrong direction. The rating target 
variable is significant, as is the capex variable for book value leverage. Age is 
marginally significant. Capex is insignificant for market value leverage, but Age is 
significant in both regressions. 
We also augment the KT procedure in other ways. To capture the interaction 
between being dividend-paying and the speed of leverage adjustment found by Fama 
and French (2002), we interact the dividend-paying dummy with the LevDef. This 
coefficient is significantly positive, indicating that dividend-paying firms adjust more 
slowly to their leverage targets than non-payers, as found by Fama and French. We 
also include interactions between the dividend change dummies and the LevDef to 
allow for different responses to deficits by the dividend-change firms. This might 
arise because firms that change their dividends are in an adjustment phase of their 
leverage policy, which could indicate faster reversion to target (Hovakimian and Li 
2010). In the book value regression, these interactions are insignificant, but in the 
market leverage regressions the interaction of the LevDef with the dividend increase 
and initiation dummies are significantly positive. This indicates that the dividend-
increasing and initiating firms respond more slowly to their market LevDefs than do 
other firms. Thus, although these firms have larger LevDefs than other firms and are 
making a major financial choice in the form of a major change in dividend policy, 
they appear to adjust more slowly towards their leverage targets if the standard partial 
adjustment formulation is used.  
Even with all these controls, the dummy for dividend increases is still highly 
significant for both the book value and market value regressions. The initiation 
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dummy is highly significant for the market leverage regression and significant for the 
book value regression. A dividend increase predicts a subsequent adjusted five-year 
book leverage increase of 4.1% and market leverage increase of 5.8%, after the 
controls. A dividend initiation predicts a book value increase of 4.9% and a market 
value increase of 10.5%. Hence, the statistically and economically significant 
increases in leverage of dividend-increasing and initiating firms found in tests using 
raw averages and the standard KT procedure are not explained by this augmented 
specification of the KT procedure.  
In contrast, for the dividend decrease sample, the dummies are now 
insignificant. For those firms, the augmented trade-off model explains the average 
leverage increase. Thus, we find significant asymmetry between dividend increasing 
and decreasing firms, consistent with GMS. 
 
IV.6 What change in leverage policy is being signaled by a dividend increase? 
As discussed above, dividend-increasing and initiating firms have significant 
LevDefs at the time of the dividend change, and they reduce these after the change. 
However, their move back towards their target is not captured by the augmented KT 
stage 2 model. Therefore, we investigate a more complex change in leverage policy 
following the dividend increase or initiation. This is intended to measure whether 
pecking order behavior changes after the dividend increase or initiation. 
To capture the possibility that dividend-increasing firms respond to financing 
deficits in a different way to other firms, we interact the dividend change dummies 
with the financing deficit (FD and FDd) and allow asymmetric responses to positive 
and negative deficits conditional on the dividend change. We also interact the 
dividend change dummies with the market timing measure (LT) and risk (SDROE) to 
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allow for the possibility that firms changing dividends by a large amount respond 
differently to these variables. 
The result is shown in the final column of Table 6, “With interactions”. The 
main result is shown graphically in Figure 1, which shows the relationship between 
FD’s in the period (0, 5) and leverage changes in that period for firms that do not 
change their dividend compared to those with large dividend increases. The FD is 
along the X-axis, with positive deficits indicating financing shortfalls and negative 
deficits indicating surpluses. The lower line is for firms that do not change their 
dividend, and indicates an almost linear response. In contrast, the higher line for firms 
increasing dividends indicates a highly asymmetric response. For financing surpluses, 
indicated by the left side of the chart, the response is insignificantly different from 
zero. Unlike average firms, these firms do not use financial surpluses to pay down 
debt. Also, the right side of the chart is steeper, indicating that they increase leverage 
at a higher rate in response to financing deficits. The overall effect of the more convex 
response function is that the average leverage of these firms increases relative to the 
no-change firms and relative to the pre-change level.  
Thus, the change in behavior is not a simple change in the partial adjustment 
coefficient, but rather this more complex conditional management of leverage. The 
differences are both statistically and economically highly significant. The coefficient 
of the dividend increase dummy is now insignificant in both the book value and 
market value regressions, indicating that this explains the average leverage increase. 
The fixed effect of the dividend decrease group remains insignificant. 
For dividend initiation firms the effect is qualitatively the same, although the 
interaction terms are not as significant because of the smaller sample. However, the 
size of the coefficients is greater, consistent with Hypothesis 1C. 
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In summary, a dividend increase or initiation appears to signal the intention to 
increase leverage towards a pre-existing leverage target, but the increase is made in a 
highly conditional way.  
 
IV.7 The effect of firm size and incentives 
Table 7 reports the coefficients of the dividend change dummies for large and 
small firms (i.e. the fixed effects from Table 6 with separate dummies for large and 
small firms). For both small and large firms, the fixed effect of dividend increases and 
initiations remains until the “pecking order interactions” are included and then 
disappears. In contrast, the augmented KT control removes the fixed effects for 
dividend-decrease firms in both groups, as for the entire sample.  
The size of the leverage increase is different for large and small firms, with a 
raw average book value leverage increase of +5.7% for large firms and +2.9% for 
small firms that increase dividends. This difference is significant. Table 8 presents 
this difference in a slightly different way by scaling the leverage increase by five 
years’ worth of the dividend increase. By this measure, large and small firms show 
very different behavior. Large firms that increase their dividends pay for a much 
larger fraction of the increase by a subsequent leverage increase. This suggests that 
the effect is unlikely to be primarily a signal of fundamental information that the 
market did not previously know. The problem of asymmetric information is much 
smaller for large firms, so if the signal were about fundamentals like unobserved 
maturity or risk, we would expect this to show a greater effect for small firms. 
Instead, we interpret the signal as being about a shift in policy. 
Table 8 sorts a subsample of the firms for which we have executive 
compensation by the level of executive compensation as well as by size. There 
24 
 
appears to be a pattern of firms with possible agency problems caused by low 
executive compensation paying for more of the dividend increase with debt. Large 
firms with poor incentives have a ratio of leverage increase to dividend increase of 
0.575 times, significant at the 1% level. In contrast, smaller firms with more high-
powered incentives have an increase that is insignificantly different from zero. The 
relationship between compensation and the leverage increase is present for all sizes of 
firm.  
Overall, these results are consistent with the combined dividend and leverage 
strategy used to control agency problems (Barclay et al. 1995; DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo 2007; Hail et al. 2014).   
 
V. Robustness tests6 
To check the robustness of the results to a different measure of the dividend 
change, we estimated the Lintner dividend model as in Fama and French (2002) and 
defined dividend changes using the residuals from this model with the same 
thresholds described above. The dividend dummies using the stage 2 KT control are 
still all highly significant. In the book (market) leverage regressions, the coefficients 
of the dividend increase dummies are 3.1% (2.0%) and the results are essentially 
unchanged.  
We further decomposed the dividend change into a part that could be predicted 
on the basis of the general relationship between dividends and fundamental variables 
(“target dividend”) and the remainder, which is unrelated to fundamentals and 
therefore discretionary. This gives a procedure that measures a “dividend gap” similar 
to the leverage gap in stage 1 of KT. The results are robust to the measurement of the 
                                                          
6
 Tables of all the results in this section are available on request from the corresponding author. 
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size of dividend changes using the discretionary part of the dividend change in this 
approach. 
We then examined the effect of using a 1% threshold for the dividend change 
rather than the 12.5% threshold. The results are qualitatively similar to the results with 
the 12.5% threshold, but smaller in magnitude. In contrast, when we use a continuous 
variable for the dividend change, the results become very mixed. Thus it appears that 
the unadjusted percentage change in dividend is not as good a signal of the change in 
leverage policy as an increase above a threshold or the residual from a Lintner-like 
model.  
We also tested alternative measures of risk, specifically beta and idiosyncratic 
variance (Grullon et al., 2002, Lee and Mauck, 2016). These variables are significant 
in the augmented KT regressions, but they do not explain the increased leverage for 
dividend-increasing and initiating firms. The qualitative and quantitative results 
regarding the change in leverage remain the same. 
We also tested whether the explanation for the link between dividend and 
leverage increases is the effect of tax (Hennessy and Whited 2005). The effect of 
taxes is already reflected to some degree in the KT procedure by including profit 
variables, which should be related to tax status. In addition, to check whether the tax 
status of companies could be changing in a way that explains the results, we also 
include in the KT stage 2 regression the change in the effective tax rate, measured as 
taxes paid divided by profits. This is insignificant and has no effect on the results. 
In our replication of KT stage 1, we include a dummy for dividend-paying 
firms. This is highly significant and consistent with the literature on the link between 
leverage and dividend levels. However, this variable is not included in the version of 
the target leverage regression used by KT. We replicate the results omitting this 
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variable from stage 1 and find that the results are insignificantly different from those 
with the dividend dummy in stage 1. 
It is possible that the relationship between dividend changes and leverage is 
caused by an omitted common factor, such as negative earnings or a different measure 
of firm maturity than the one we use, Age. To capture the link between negative 
earnings and dividend decreases (DeAngelo et al. 1992), we included in the stage 2 
regression a dummy variable LOSS, which takes the value 1 if there is a loss in the 
year prior to the dividend change, as well as its interaction with the dividend change 
dummies. As a measure of firm maturity, we included in the stage 2 regression a 
dummy variable ESTAB, which takes the value 1 if there are at least 10 years of 
positive earnings and dividend payments prior to the first annual loss (Koch and Sun 
2004), and its interaction with the dividend change dummies. Although the variables 
LOSS and ESTAB are significant with the correct signs in both book and market 
leverage regressions, they do not significantly change the magnitude and significance 
of the fixed effect associated with dividend increases. The coefficient of DIV_INC is 
4.7% with a p-value of 0.0% in the book value regression and 7.4% with a p-value of 
0.0% in the market value regression. 
To investigate further the long-term effects of dividend changes, we ran the 
augmented model by using the future CF variable in the five-year period from 5 to 10 
years after the dividend change event. The level and change of this variable are 
significant in the market value leverage regression but not in the book value leverage 
regression. The results corroborate our previous findings. For both book value and 
market value leverage, the fixed effects associated with dividend increases are still 
highly significant and similar to those without this control.  
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We also examined the robustness of our results to the inclusion of mixed event 
observations (rather than excluding them). This gave only small differences in the 
economic significance of the leverage increases for the dividend-increasing firms. 
However, this result should be interpreted with caution. For example, if a firm 
initiated and increased dividends within a five-year period, and if both events have 
positive impact on subsequent leverage, then it would not be clear if the leverage 
increase should be attributed to dividend initiation or increase. Hence, the results for 
the sample including mixed events depend on the relative frequencies of different 
types of mixed events as well as the effects of different events. 
We ran the same tests using samples of firms making significant repurchases. 
All the results are consistent with those for the dividend-increase sample in the sense 
that there are significant increases in leverage in the period (0, 5), and these are not 
explained until we include the interaction of the dividend initiation or repurchase 
dummy with the pecking order behavior. Furthermore, the sizes of the changes in 
leverage are consistent with the strength of the signal being given. We rank the 
strength of the dividend signal as weakest for repurchases and strongest for initiations, 
with dividend increases in between. The average book value (market value) leverage 
increases are +0.028 (+0.043) for repurchases, +0.050 (+0.057) for dividend 
increases, and +0.056 (+0.094) for initiations. Thus, the sizes of the average leverage 
increases are in the same rank order as the strength of the signals. 
Finally, we tested for the effect found by Fuller and Goldstein (2011) that 
dividends matter more in declining markets. We estimated Table 6 for the sub-period 
of the crisis, 2008-2010. Consistent with their results, we found a larger leverage 
increase subsequent to dividend increases and initiations, especially for market value 
leverage. As in other periods, the leverage increase is not explained until we introduce 
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the pecking order interactions. Interestingly, however, the interaction of the dividend 
increase dummy with the financial deficit variables becomes insignificant, suggesting 
that the mechanism of the leverage adjustment changed during the period of the crisis. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
Firms increasing dividends by a large amount subsequently increase leverage. 
On average, this is equal to the leverage deficit at the time of the dividend increase, 
but the adjustment towards the target leverage is not captured by a standard partial 
adjustment model. Instead, these firms display a much more convex response to 
financing deficits, which raises their average leverage increase. The behavior is not 
explained by a moving leverage target, and is consistent with the dividend increase 
signalling the intention to increase leverage back to the target. 
The results are robust to many alternative specifications, including augmenting 
the Kayhan-Titman model of empirical leverage behavior with variables known to be 
related to dividend increases. The signal about the discretionary change in future 
leverage policy given by a large dividend increase appears to be incremental to signals 
about other firm characteristics. In contrast, large dividend decreases also signal an 
increase in leverage but not one that discretionary. 
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APPENDIX: Estimates of the Kayhan–Titman regressions 
 
This Appendix shows the estimation of stages 1 and 2 of the KT model. Stage 
1, shown in Table A1, relates leverage to contemporaneous firm characteristics using 
a Tobit regression.7 The predicted leverage from this regression is taken as an 
indication of the target leverage of the firm. Despite the different data period (1980–
2010 rather than 1960–2003 used by KT), the results are very similar to KT’s. The 
variables are all highly significant and have the same sign as in KT. The average 
target leverage is also similar to KT’s. In our regression, we augment the KT variables 
with a dummy variable (DIV_PAY), which takes the value 1 if the firm is dividend-
paying. This is significantly negative, consistent with the result in Frank and Goyal 
(2009) that dividend-paying firms tend to have lower leverage. 
Table A2 shows the result of stage 2 of the KT procedure.8 This relates the 
change in leverage over five years to variables that include the LevDef at time zero 
and changes in firm characteristics over the same five years. This replicates the result 
in KT and gives very similar results to their paper.  
  
                                                          
7
 The regression also includes 48 industry dummies. 
8
 We estimate standard errors by bootstrapping using 500 replications. 
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Table A1: Tobit regression of leverage on contemporaneous variables (stage 1 of 
KT) 
This table shows estimates of stage 1 of the KT model. This relates leverage to 
contemporaneous firm characteristics using a Tobit regression. Specifically, this 
model explains the leverage ratio with the market-to-book ratio (M/B), asset 
tangibility (PPE, net property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets), 
profitability (EBITD, operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets), 
research and development expense (R&D scaled by net sales), R&D dummy (a 
dummy variable that is set to 1 if the firm has no R&D expense), selling expense (SE, 
selling expense scaled by net sales), and firm size (SIZE, logarithm of net sales). The 
predicted value of the leverage ratio is restricted to be between 0 and 100. Panel 5A 
presents estimates of KT model specification. Panel 5B augments the KT model 
specification with a dummy variable (DIV_PAY), which takes the value 1 if the firm 
is dividend-paying.  
 
Dependent variable: Book leverage   Dependent variable: Market leverage 
 
Coef.(p-value) 
  
Coef.(p-value) 
     
DIV_PAY -0.0433(0.00) 
 
DIV_PAY -0.0475(0.00) 
Market-to-book -0.0041(0.00) 
 
Market-to-book -0.0157(0.00) 
Prop, plant & equip 0.1161(0.00) 
 
Prop, plant & equip 0.1516(0.00) 
Profitability -0.3593(0.00) 
 
Profitability -0.4653(0.00) 
Selling expense -0.0510(0.00) 
 
Selling expense -0.0821(0.00) 
R&D -0.0623(0.00) 
 
R&D -0.0710(0.00) 
R&D dummy 0.0305(0.00) 
 
R&D dummy 0.0460(0.00) 
Size 0.0259(0.00) 
 
Size 0.0140(0.00) 
Number of obs 101,523 
 
Number of obs 105,117 
Prob.>X
2
 0.00 
 
Prob.>X
2
 0.00 
LR X
2
 (49) 22134.5   LR X
2
 (49) 33423.7 
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Table A2: Regression of leverage changes on explanatory variables (stage 2 of 
KT) 
This shows the result of stage 2 of the KT procedure. This relates the change in 
leverage over five years to variables that measure changes in firm characteristics over 
the same period. The dependent variable is the change in leverage between year t and 
t-5. The financial deficit (FD) is the total external financing between year t and t-5, 
the positive financial deficit (FDd) is the total financial deficit interacted with a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 when FD is positive, and yearly timing (YT) is 
the covariance between the financial deficit and the market-to-book ratio from year t 
to t-5. Long-term timing (LT) is the product of the average market-to-book ratio and 
average external financing between year t and t-5. The five-year cumulative stock 
return (r) is the cumulative log return on stock between year t and t-5. The five-year 
cumulative profitability (EBITD) is the sum of earnings before interest, taxes, and 
depreciation between year t and t-5, scaled by the beginning-period firm value. The 
leverage deficit (LevDef) is the difference between leverage and target leverage at t-5, 
the target leverage is the predicted value of the leverage ratio, and change in target 
(ΔTarget) is the difference in target leverage between t and t-5. The statistics are 
obtained from 500 bootstrap replications resampled from the actual dataset. The 
standard error is the sample standard error of the 500.   
 
Dependent variable: Change in book leverage (0, 5) 
Obs 46461 (clusters 5339) 
Coef. Std. err. p-value 
[95% conf. 
interval] 
      
Financial deficit (FD) 0.0972 0.0076 0.0000 0.0823 0.1120 
Financial deficit for positive (FDd) 0.0284 0.0096 0.0030 0.0097 0.0472 
Yearly timing (YT) -0.0663 0.0182 0.0000 -0.1019 -0.0308 
Long-term timing (LT) -0.1317 0.0067 0.0000 -0.1448 -0.1185 
Five-year cum. Stock return (r) -0.0190 0.0008 0.0000 -0.0206 -0.0173 
Five-year cum. profitability (EBITD5y) -0.0426 0.0031 0.0000 -0.0488 -0.0364 
Book leverage deficit (BLevDef) -0.3257 0.0067 0.0000 -0.3389 -0.3125 
Change in book target (ΔTarget) 0.5181 0.0243 0.0000 0.4705 0.5657 
 
 
Dependent variable: Change in market leverage (0, 5) 
Obs 46697 (clusters 5394) 
Coef Std. err. p-value 
[95% conf. 
interval] 
      
Financial deficit (FD) 0.1107 0.0076 0.0000 0.0957 0.1257 
Financial deficit for positive (FDd) 0.0348 0.0096 0.0000 0.0160 0.0536 
Yearly timing (YT) -0.0730 0.0173 0.0000 -0.1070 -0.0390 
Long-term timing (LT) -0.1056 0.0072 0.0000 -0.1197 -0.0916 
Five-year cum. Stock return (r) -0.0668 0.0010 0.0000 -0.0687 -0.0649 
Five-year cum. profitability (EBITD5y) 0.0018 0.0033 0.5860 -0.0046 0.0082 
Market leverage deficit (MLevDef) -0.3785 0.0068 0.0000 -0.3918 -0.3651 
Change in market target (ΔTarget) 0.6459 0.0182 0.0000 0.6102 0.6817 
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Figure 1: Response of book value leverage to financial deficits of dividend-
increasing firms relative to firms with no dividend change 
The figure shows the average response to a financial deficit of the book value 
leverage of firms that increase dividends relative to those that do not change 
dividends. The leverage change is measured over the five years following the 
dividend change. 
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Table 1: Leverage ratios and other characteristics of firms with large dividend 
increases and decreases 
Panel 1A shows summary statistics for dividend increases, decreases, and initiations 
at the time of the dividend change. Panel 1B shows summary statistics for the sample 
of firms that pay regular dividends but do not exhibit significant dividend changes (no 
dividend change sample). Date zero (the event year) is set as the corresponding fiscal 
year end of the quarter of the dividend change or initiation. Mixed event observations 
within a five-year period are excluded. When a firm has succeeding dividend changes 
in the same direction within a five-year period, only the first dividend change in the 
series is used. Book leverage (BLEV) is the book debt to book assets, and market 
leverage (MLEV) is the book debt to the sum of book debt and market equity. Other 
variables are market-to-book ratio (M/B), asset tangibility (PPE, net property, plant, 
and equipment scaled by total assets), profitability (EBITD, operating income before 
depreciation scaled by total assets), research and development expense (R&D scaled 
by net sales), selling expense (SE, selling expense scaled by net sales), and firm size 
(SIZE, logarithm of net sales). The financial deficit (FD) is the total external 
financing between year t and t-5, the positive financial deficit (FDd) is the total 
financial deficit interacted with a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when FD is 
positive, and yearly timing (YT) is the covariance between the financial deficit and 
the market-to-book ratio from year t to t-5. Long-term timing (LT) is the product of 
the average market-to-book ratio and average external financing between year t and t-
5. The five-year cumulative stock return (R) is the cumulative log return on stock 
between year t and t-5. Five-year cumulative profitability (EBITD) is the sum of 
earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation between year t and t-5, scaled by the 
beginning-period firm value. Comparison columns show tests of differences among 
the different categories. 
 
Panel 1A: Dividend increases, decreases, and initiations  
  Dividend increase 
sample (4,374) 
  Dividend decrease 
sample (2,522) 
  Dividend increases 
minus decreases 
  
Mean Std. dev. 
 
Mean Std. dev. 
 
Dif. p-value 
Book leverage  0.430 0.173 0.469 0.179 -0.039 0.000 
Market leverage 0.296 0.177 0.351 0.200 -0.054 0.000 
Market-to-book 2.356 1.318 2.182 1.341 0.154 0.000 
Prop, plant & equip 0.352 0.209 0.372 0.213 -0.020 0.001 
Profitability 0.185 0.071 0.156 0.085 0.028 0.000 
Selling expense 0.204 0.123 0.196 0.130 0.008 0.037 
R&D 0.017 0.036 0.013 0.028 0.004 0.000 
Size 6.846 1.806   6.704 1.890   0.143 0.054 
FD 0.205 0.311 0.193 0.351 0.011 0.343 
FDd 0.244 0.246 0.249 0.266 -0.005 0.591 
YT 0.004 0.037 0.005 0.047 -0.001 0.723 
LT 0.105 0.160 0.106 0.187 -0.001 0.867 
R 0.429 0.997 0.327 0.991 0.101 0.005 
EBITD 0.848 0.310 0.765 0.323 0.083 0.000 
(continued on next page) 
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Dividend initiations 
sample (394 obs) 
  Initiations minus 
Increase 
  Decrease minus 
Initiations   
 Mean Std. Dev.   Dif. p-value 
 
Dif. p-value 
        0.383 0.189 
 
-0.045 0.000 
 
0.084 0.000 
0.286 0.198 
 
-0.010 0.352 
 
0.065 0.000 
2.200 1.297 
 
-0.156 0.058 
 
0.003 0.975 
0.288 0.214 
 
-0.064 0.000 
 
0.084 0.000 
0.167 0.084 
 
-0.018 0.000 
 
-0.010 0.061 
0.213 0.141 
 
0.009 0.272 
 
-0.017 0.050 
0.018 0.041 
 
0.002 0.482 
 
-0.006 0.003 
5.818 1.725 
 
-1.028 0.000 
 
0.886 0.000 
0.257 0.342 
 
0.052 0.044 
 
-0.063 0.031 
0.294 0.290 
 
0.050 0.014 
 
-0.045 0.046 
0.013 0.052 
 
0.009 0.007 
 
-0.008 0.044 
0.125 0.183 
 
0.020 0.128 
 
-0.019 0.220 
0.159 0.978 
 
-0.270 0.001 
 
0.168 0.043 
0.758 0.363   -0.090 0.000   0.007 0.788 
 
 
 
 
Panel 1B: No dividend change sample compared with increases, decreases, and 
initiations 
 
 
  No dividend change 
sample (3,526 obs) 
  No dividend change 
minus increase 
  No dividend change 
minus decrease 
  No dividend change 
minus initiations   
Mean Std. Dev.   Dif. p-value Dif. p-value Dif. p-value 
Book leverage  0.457 0.175 0.028 0.000 -0.012 0.004 0.072 0.000 
Market leverage 0.410 0.207 0.114 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.124 0.000 
Market-to-book 1.588 1.113 -0.769 0.000 -0.615 0.000 -0.613 0.000 
Prop, Plant & Equip 0.369 0.213 0.017 0.000 -0.002 0.629 0.081 0.000 
Profitability 0.156 0.083 -0.029 0.000 -0.001 0.716 -0.011 0.027 
Selling Expense 0.210 2.229 0.005 0.904 0.013 0.806 -0.004 0.978 
R&D 0.013 0.081 -0.004 0.007 0.000 0.962 -0.006 0.246 
Size 6.037 1.884 -0.810 0.000 -0.667 0.000 0.218 0.053 
Financ. deficit (FD) 0.213 0.333 0.008 0.289 0.020 0.046 -0.044 0.099 
Pos. Fin. Def. (FDD) 0.256 0.265 0.012 0.048 0.007 0.348 -0.038 0.074 
Yearly timing (YT) 0.005 0.039 0.000 0.740 0.000 0.877 -0.008 0.008 
Long-term tim. (LT) 0.085 0.146 -0.020 0.000 -0.021 0.000 -0.040 0.000 
5-year return (r) 0.525 1.132 0.096 0.000 0.198 0.000 0.366 0.000 
5-year profit. (EBITD) 0.736 0.322   -0.112 0.000   -0.029 0.002   -0.022 0.399 
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Table 2: Leverage ratios and firm characteristics of firms changing dividends by 
large amounts 
This table presents leverage and other firm characteristics over time for firms that 
increase, decrease, and initiate dividends in panels 2A,2B, and 2C respectively. Date 
zero (t=0) is set as the corresponding fiscal year end of the quarter of the dividend 
change or initiation. Change from 0 to 5 is the change between year 0 and year +5. 
Book leverage (BLEV) is the book debt to book assets, and market leverage (MLEV) 
is the book debt to the sum of book debt and market equity. EBITD is the operating 
income before depreciation scaled by total assets; BE is the book value of equity; ME 
is the market value of equity; SIZE is the natural logarithm of net sales; R&D is the 
research and development expense scaled by net sales; SE is the selling expense 
scaled by net sales; PPE is the net property, plant, and equipment scaled by total 
assets; and M/B is the market-to-book ratio. 
 
 
Panel 2A. Dividend increases 
 
YEAR 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Change 
from 0 to 5 
p-value 
BLEV 0.430 0.439 0.449 0.459 0.469 0.479 0.050 0.000 
MLEV 0.298 0.312 0.327 0.339 0.349 0.355 0.057 0.000 
EBITD 0.185 0.175 0.166 0.158 0.156 0.155 -0.030 0.000 
BE 2753.8 2892.7 2928.4 2917.8 2790.7 2700.8 -53.0 0.818 
ME 6634.8 7022.9 7513.6 7614.9 7692.4 7701.8 1066.9 0.077 
SIZE 6.9644 7.0539 7.1068 7.1041 7.1180 7.1370 0.173 0.000 
R&D 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.019 0.020 0.017 -0.002 0.323 
SE 0.206 0.207 0.209 0.222 0.560 0.217 0.011 0.015 
PPE 0.351 0.351 0.349 0.347 0.345 0.345 -0.006 0.272 
M/B 2.360 2.242 2.390 2.201 2.373 2.544 0.184 0.003 
 
 
 
Panel 2B. Dividend decreases 
YEAR 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Change 
from 0 to 5 
p-value 
BLEV 0.469 0.476 0.480 0.487 0.485 0.488 0.020 0.002 
MLEV 0.354 0.368 0.376 0.384 0.383 0.381 0.027 0.000 
EBITD 0.154 0.150 0.149 0.148 0.146 0.145 -0.009 0.003 
BE 2863.9 2603.1 2486.1 2604.2 2582.1 2544.8 -319.0 0.348 
ME 5887.7 5794.9 6145.2 6304.8 6423.7 6855.5 967.8 0.176 
SIZE 6.7769 6.8339 6.8943 6.9562 6.9849 7.0315 0.255 0.000 
RD 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 -0.002 0.094 
SE 0.197 0.197 0.197 0.199 0.201 0.205 0.007 0.106 
PPE 0.367 0.365 0.361 0.357 0.357 0.351 -0.016 0.026 
M/B 2.177 2.309 2.060 2.253 2.129 2.514 0.338 0.232 
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Panel 2C. Dividend initiations 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 Dif(5, 0) Sign. Dif 
BLEV 0.382 0.389 0.411 0.442 0.443 0.438 0.056 0.004 
MLEV 0.282 0.300 0.330 0.358 0.374 0.376 0.094 0.000 
EBITD 0.167 0.162 0.155 0.144 0.143 0.139 -0.028 0.002 
BE 771.2 791.4 922.7 965.3 1136.1 806.9 35.641 0.877 
ME 2001.2 1902.8 1958.1 1717.9 2155.4 2026.1 24.944 0.975 
SIZESL 5.8483 5.9256 5.9965 6.1063 6.1497 6.0724 0.224 0.192 
RD 0.021 0.020 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.015 -0.006 0.108 
SE 0.219 0.220 0.228 0.239 0.293 2.683 2.464 0.189 
PPE 0.276 0.281 0.288 0.293 0.302 0.314 0.038 0.056 
M/B 2.214 2.230 2.146 1.894 1.734 1.989 -0.225 0.319 
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Table 3: Target leverage ratios and leverage deficits of firms with large dividend 
increases, decreases, and initiations 
Panel 3A shows summary statistics for dividend increases, decreases, and initiations. 
Panel 3B shows summary statistics for the sample of firms that pay regular dividends 
but do not exhibit significant dividend changes (no dividend change sample). Date 
zero (t=0) is set as the corresponding fiscal year end of the quarter of the dividend 
change or initiation. Leverage deficit (LevDef) is the difference between leverage and 
target leverage, where target leverage is the predicted value of the leverage ratio from 
stage 1 of KT, as described in the Appendix. Comparison columns show tests of 
differences among the categories. 
 
 
Panel 3A: Dividend increases, decreases, and initiations  
  Dividend increase 
sample (4,374) 
 
Dividend decrease 
sample (2,522) 
 
Dividend increases 
minus decreases 
  
Mean Std. dev. 
 
Mean Std. dev. 
 
Dif. p-value 
LevDef (book) -0.052 0.136 -0.028 0.144 -0.023 0.000 
LevDef (market) -0.111 0.139 -0.081 0.160 -0.030 0.000 
Target BLEV 0.487 0.078 0.495 0.071 -0.008 0.006 
Target MLEV 0.412 0.106 
 
0.429 0.095 
 
-0.017 0.000 
 
 
 Dividend initiations 
sample (394)   
Initiations minus 
Increase  
Initiations minus 
Decrease  
  
Mean Std. dev. 
 
Mean Std. dev. 
 
Dif. p-value 
LevDef (book) -0.072 0.145 -0.020 0.073 -0.043 0.000 
LevDef (market) -0.115 0.149 -0.004 0.706 -0.034 0.011 
Target BLEV 0.471 0.081 -0.016 0.013 -0.024 0.000 
Target MLEV 0.407 0.113 
 
-0.005 0.582 
 
-0.022 0.006 
 
 
 
Panel 3B: No dividend change sample compared with increases and decreases 
 
  No dividend change 
sample (3,526) 
 
No dividend change 
minus increase 
 
No dividend change 
minus decrease 
 
Mean Std. dev. 
 
Dif. p-value Dif. p-value 
LevDef (book) -0.025 0.145 0.027 0.000 0.003 0.431 
LevDef (market) -0.025 0.167 0.086 0.000 0.056 0.000 
Target BLEV 0.488 0.074 0.001 0.458 -0.006 0.004 
Target MLEV 0.433 0.096 
 
0.021 0.000 
 
0.003 0.229 
 
 
 
 41 
 
Table 4: Evolution of leverage targets of firms changing dividends by large amounts 
This table presents average leverage targets estimated using stage 1 of KT (as described in the Appendix) for firms that increase, decrease, and 
initiate dividends. Date zero (t=0) is set as the corresponding fiscal year end of the quarter of the dividend change. Book leverage is the book 
debt to book assets, and market leverage is the book debt to the sum of book debt and market equity.  
 
Dividend increase sample 
  -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Target book leverage 0.476 0.473 0.474 0.479 0.484 0.487 0.487 0.488 0.488 0.488 0.488 
Target market leverage 0.404 0.398 0.396 0.401 0.406 0.412 0.410 0.413 0.413 0.411 0.410 
            Dividend decrease sample 
  -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Target book leverage 0.488 0.488 0.490 0.492 0.493 0.495 0.495 0.496 0.496 0.497 0.499 
Target market leverage 0.426 0.424 0.424 0.426 0.427 0.429 0.428 0.427 0.425 0.425 0.428 
            Dividend initiations sample 
  -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Target book leverage 0.473 0.477 0.481 0.480 0.481 0.473 0.435 0.430 0.443 0.456 0.455 
Target market leverage 0.423 0.429 0.432 0.428 0.427 0.414 0.368 0.359 0.374 0.391 0.390 
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Table 5. Target leverage ratios, leverage deficits, and changes in leverage of 
firms with large dividend increases, decreases, and initiations 
 
The table shows average leverage, targets, and deficits at the time of a large dividend 
change (date 0), and also the changes in leverage and target over the subsequent five 
years (0–5). Date zero (t=0) is set as the corresponding fiscal year end of the quarter 
of the dividend change. Leverage targets and deficits are estimated using stage 1 of 
KT as described in the Appendix. Panel 5A is for firms increasing dividends, Panel 
5B for firms decreasing dividends, and Panel 5C for firms initiating dividends. 
 
Panel 5A: Dividend increase sample 
 
Date 0 Change 0–5 
  Leverage Target Deficit ∆Leverage ∆Target 
Book value 0.430 0.487 -0.052 0.05 0.001 
Market value 0.298 0.412 -0.111 0.057 -0.002 
Panel 5B: Dividend increase sample 
 
Date 0 Change 0–5 
  Leverage Target Deficit ∆Leverage ∆Target 
Book value 0.469 0.495 -0.028 0.02 0.004 
Market value 0.354 0.429 -0.081 0.027 -0.001 
      Panel 5C: Dividend initiation sample 
 
Date 0 Change 0–5 
  Leverage Target Deficit ∆Leverage ∆Target 
Book value 0.382 0.471 -0.072 0.056 -0.018 
Market value 0.282 0.407 -0.115 0.094 -0.023 
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Table 6: Factors explaining the change in book leverage over the five years 
following a large dividend change 
This table shows the change in book leverage of firms that increase dividends 
(DIV_INC), initiate dividends (DIV_INI), and decrease dividends (DIV_DEC). 
Leverage changes are measured over the five years following the dividend change. 
“No controls” measures the average change for each group. “KT model control” 
includes stage 2 of the KT model as a control. The KT variables are as described in 
the Appendix. “Augmented KT control” includes stage 2 of KT augmented with the 
level and change of five-year cumulative cash flow (CF), level and change of 
variability of return on equity (SD ROE), rating proxy (CREDIT RISK), interaction of 
the leverage deficit with a dividend-paying dummy (DIV_PAY*BevDef), and 
interactions between the dividend change dummies and the leverage deficit and cash 
flow. The statistics are obtained from 500 bootstrap replications resampled from the 
actual dataset. The standard error (in parenthesis) is the sample standard error of the 
500. Significance levels are ***1%, **5%, and *10%. 
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Panel 6A: Dependent variable: Change in book value leverage 
  No controls KT model control Augmented KT With interactions 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Fixed effects of: 
Dividend increase (DIV_INC) 0.050 0.002*** 0.031 0.003*** 0.041 0.01*** 0.004 0.012 
Dividend decrease (DIV_DEC) 0.020 0.003*** 0.016 0.004*** 0.006 0.013 -0.026 0.02 
Dividend initiation (DIV_INI) 0.056 0.011*** 0.058 0.009*** 0.049 0.027* -0.011 0.035 
Control variables: 
Book leverage deficit (BlevDef) -0.324 0.007*** -0.345 0.012*** -0.345 0.013*** 
DIV_PAY*BlevDef 0.044 0.016*** 0.045 0.015*** 
Change in book target 
(BlevΔtarget) 
0.518 0.024*** 0.311 0.034*** 0.309 0.032*** 
Ficial deficit (FD) 0.097 0.007*** 0.097 0.01*** 0.101 0.01*** 
Ficial deficit for positive (FDd) 0.030 0.009*** 0.032 0.012*** 0.025 0.012** 
Yearly timing (YT) -0.064 0.018*** -0.054 0.025** -0.054 0.028* 
Long-term timing (LT) -0.133 0.006*** -0.141 0.011*** -0.145 0.011*** 
Five-year cum. Stoc return (r) -0.019 0.001*** -0.018 0.001*** -0.018 0.001*** 
Five-year cum. Profit. (EBITD5y) -0.045 0.003*** 0.022 0.011** 0.022 0.011* 
CF (5years after) -0.087 0.015*** -0.088 0.016*** 
ΔCF (after - before) -0.069 0.007*** -0.069 0.007*** 
SD ROE (5years after) -0.009 0.012 -0.009 0.013 
ΔSD ROE (after - before) 0.009 0.005* 0.009 0.006 
Rating target (CREDIT RISK) 0.014 0.004*** 0.013 0.004*** 
Age 0.005 0.003* 0.005 0.003* 
Capex 0.027 0.007*** 0.027 0.007*** 
    
Interactions: 
DIV_INC * BlevDef 0.029 0.025 0.007 0.025 
DIV_INC * CF -0.015 0.015 0.005 0.016 
DIV_INC * LT 0.031 0.042 
DIV_INC * SDROE 0.081 0.035** 
DIV_INC * FD -0.071 0.037* 
DIV_INC * FDd 0.121 0.043*** 
DIV_DEC * BlevDef 0.030 0.032 0.004 0.031 
DIV_DEC * CF 0.016 0.02 0.030 0.018* 
DIV_DEC * LT 0.044 0.037 
DIV_DEC * SDROE 0.084 0.03*** 
DIV_DEC * FD 0.008 0.037 
DIV_DEC * FDd 0.040 0.043 
DIV_INI * BlevDef -0.104 0.072 -0.129 0.069* 
DIV_INI * CF -0.001 0.043 0.010 0.046 
DIV_INI * LT 
  
0.229 0.098** 
DIV_INI * SDROE 
  
0.104 0.083 
DIV_INI * FD     -0.212 0.126* 
DIV_INI * FDd             0.216 0.137 
Adj-R2 0.3% 26.5% 28.3% 28.6% 
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Panel 6B: Dependent variable: Change in market value leverage  
  No controls KT model control Augmented KT With interactions 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Fixed effects of: 
Dividend increase (DIV_INC) 0.057 0.003*** 0.022 0.002*** 0.058 0.01*** 0.012 0.012 
Dividend decrease (DIV_DEC) 0.027 0.005*** 0.014 0.003*** 0.018 0.015 -0.016 0.013 
Dividend initiation (DIV_INI) 0.094 0.012*** 0.075 0.010*** 0.105 0.028*** 0.042 0.031 
Control variables: 
Book leverage deficit (BlevDef) -0.375 0.006*** -0.429 0.012*** -0.432 0.012*** 
DIV_PAY*BlevDef 0.043 0.014*** 0.045 0.014*** 
Change in book target 
(BlevΔtarget) 0.647 0.017*** 
0.546 0.023*** 0.547 0.025*** 
Ficial deficit (FD) 0.111 0.007*** 0.113 0.009*** 0.115 0.009*** 
Ficial deficit for positive (FDd) 0.036 0.009*** 0.040 0.012*** 0.035 0.012*** 
Yearly timing (YT) -0.071 0.016*** -0.060 0.027** -0.061 0.025** 
Long-term timing (LT) -0.106 0.007*** -0.117 0.01*** -0.122 0.01*** 
Five-year cum. Stoc return (r) -0.067 0.001*** -0.066 0.001*** -0.066 0.001*** 
Five-year cum. Profit. (EBITD5y) 0.000 0.003 0.050 0.01*** 0.050 0.01*** 
CF (5years after) -0.085 0.014*** -0.086 0.015*** 
ΔCF (after - before) -0.033 0.007*** -0.032 0.008*** 
SD ROE (5years after) -0.014 0.01 -0.014 0.009 
ΔSD ROE (after - before) 0.014 0.006** 0.014 0.007** 
Rating target (CREDIT RISK) 0.059 0.004*** 0.058 0.004*** 
Age 0.007 0.003** 0.007 0.003** 
Capex 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 
    
Interactions: 
DIV_INC * BlevDef 0.039 0.023* 0.014 0.023 
DIV_INC * CF -0.051 0.015*** -0.025 0.016 
DIV_INC * LT 0.012 0.029 
DIV_INC * SDROE 0.116 0.032*** 
DIV_INC * FD -0.047 0.031 
DIV_INC * FDd 0.119 0.038*** 
DIV_DEC * BlevDef -0.013 0.035 -0.012 0.034 
DIV_DEC * CF -0.002 0.025 0.015 0.021 
DIV_DEC * LT 0.074 0.036** 
DIV_DEC * SDROE 0.102 0.028*** 
DIV_DEC * FD 0.046 0.041 
DIV_DEC * FDd -0.008 0.049 
DIV_INI * BlevDef 0.163 0.076** 0.186 0.07*** 
DIV_INI * CF -0.006 0.046 0.025 0.043 
DIV_INI * LT 0.183 0.092** 
DIV_INI * SDROE 0.112 0.065* 
DIV_INI * FD -0.185 0.096* 
DIV_INI * FDd             0.185 0.099* 
Adj-R2 0.6% 48.3% 49.6% 49.9% 
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Table 7: Factors explaining the change in book and market leverage over the five years following a large dividend change, large and 
small firms 
The table shows the level and significance of the leverage change following a large dividend change. The fixed effects are measured as the 
coefficients of dummy variables for firms that increase (DIV_INC), decrease (DIV_DEC), and initiate (DIV_INI) dividends. Leverage changes are 
measured over the five years following the dividend change. “No controls” measures the average change for each group. “KT model control” includes stage 2 
of the KT model as a control. “Augmented KT control” includes stage 2 of KT augmented with the variables described in Table 6. “Augmented KT control 
plus pecking order interactions” further adds interactions between the dividend change dummies and long-term timing (LT), return volatility (SD ROE), the 
fiscal deficit (FD), and the positive fiscal deficit (FDd). Large firms are the larger half of firms in the sample, and small firms the smaller half. The statistics 
are obtained from 500 bootstrap replications resampled from the actual dataset. The standard error (in parentheses) is the sample standard error of the 500.  
Significance levels are ***1%, **5%, and *10%. 
 
Panel 7A: Book value leverage 
  No controls KT model control Augmented KT With interactions 
 (ave. ch) Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Full sample: 
Dividend increase (DIV_INC) 0.050 0.002*** 0.031 0.003*** 0.040 0.010*** 0.003 0.012 
Dividend decrease (DIV_DEC) 0.020 0.003*** 0.016 0.004*** 0.006 0.011 -0.024 0.013 
Dividend initiation (DIV_INI) 0.056 0.011*** 0.058 0.009*** 0.049 0.027* -0.008 0.034 
Large firms: 
        Dividend increase (DIV_INC) 0.057 0.003*** 0.026 0.003*** 0.042 0.011*** 0.001 0.014 
Dividend decrease (DIV_DEC) 0.022 0.004*** 0.013 0.004*** 0.007 0.013 -0.017 0.013 
Dividend initiation (DIV_INI) 0.061 0.014*** 0.053 0.012*** 0.032 0.036 -0.046 0.038 
Small firms: 
        Dividend increase (DIV_INC) 0.029 0.006*** 0.021 0.006*** 0.031 0.019* -0.015 0.021 
Dividend decrease (DIV_DEC) 0.019 0.007*** 0.011 0.007 0.008 0.018 -0.028 0.022 
Dividend initiation (DIV_INI) 0.046 0.018*** 0.084 0.014*** 0.049 0.037 -0.022 0.061 
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Panel 7B: Market value leverage 
  No controls KT model control Augmented KT With interactions 
 (ave. ch) Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Full sample: 
Dividend increase (DIV_INC) 0.570 0.003*** 0.022 0.002*** 0.059 0.009*** 0.014 0.011 
Dividend decrease (DIV_DEC) 0.027 0.005*** 0.014 0.003*** 0.019 0.013 -0.013 0.014 
Dividend initiation (DIV_INI) 0.094 0.012*** 0.075 0.010*** 0.108 0.026*** 0.051 0.034 
Large firms: 
        Dividend increase (DIV_INC) 0.068 0.003*** 0.021 0.003*** 0.045 0.012*** -0.003 0.014 
Dividend decrease (DIV_DEC) 0.035 0.005*** 0.016 0.004*** 0.016 0.016 -0.009 0.016 
Dividend initiation (DIV_INI) 0.108 0.014*** 0.071 0.012*** 0.104 0.04*** 0.046 0.04 
Small firms: 
        Dividend increase (DIV_INC) 0.043 0.007*** 0.018 0.007** 0.063 0.021*** 0.026 0.021 
Dividend decrease (DIV_DEC) 0.027 0.009*** 0.003 0.008 0.018 0.025 -0.011 0.028 
Dividend initiation (DIV_INI) 0.092 0.021*** 0.090 0.016*** 0.097 0.042** -0.039 0.058 
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Table 8: The ratio of the change in leverage to five years’ worth of dividend 
increases (large dividend-increase firms) 
The table shows averages of the ratio between the dollar equivalent of the residuals 
from the KT stage 2 book value regression (shown in the Appendix) and five years of 
the annualized dollar dividend change. It measures the ratio of the change in leverage 
over five years to five years’ worth of the dividend increase. In Panel 7A, firms are 
first sorted by size into two groups. In Panel 7B, the subsample of firms (783) for 
which we have executive compensation data is sorted into terciles by both size and the 
level of executive compensation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance 
levels are ***1%, **5%, and *10%. 
 
 
Panel 8A: Whole sample sorted by size  
  Small size Large size All 
Average 0.212(0.065)*** 0.666(0.211)*** 0.440(0.111)*** 
 
 
Panel 8B: Executive compensation subsample sorted by size and compensation 
  Small size Medium size Large size 
Low compensation 0.252(0.099)** 0.268(0.127)** 0.575(0.154)*** 
Medium compensation 0.115(0.053)** 0.302(0.130)** 0.488(0.108)*** 
High compensation      0.021(0.050) 0.149(0.081)* 0.306(0.117)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
